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COMMENT
YOUR FORUM OR MINE?
WHERE TO ARBITRATE
INVESTOR-BROKER
SECURITIES CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,1 coupled with its decision in Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon2 two years earlier, has made all Securities Act claims
and RICO claims arbitrable if a broker and its customer enter a valid pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. 3 However, a nettlesome problem faces both customers and
brokers in the wake of the Court's4 recent decisions: what is the appropriate forum
for customer-broker arbitration?
Customers have traditionally chafed at arbitrating their claims in front of
panels sponsored and subsidized by the securities industry, 5 but the vast majority
of all customer-broker arbitrations take place in these forums. 6 Brokerage houses,
on the other hand, are leery of arbitrating before the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), a private organization not affiliated with the securities'
industry. 7 With the recent explosion of investor grievances, and hence, arbitrations, 8 the brokerage houses are feeling the financial bite of subsidizing this
burgeoning area of alternative dispute resolution. 9
While the number of

1. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
2. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).

3. In McMahon, the Court held that broker-investor disputes involving claims arising under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable. Id, at 238. The Court in Rodriguez went one step
further and held that disputes arising under the 1933 Securities were also arbitrable. See Rodriguez,
490 U.S. at 480-81.
4. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
5. Serota, The Unjustified Furor Over SecuritiesArbitration, 16 PEPPERDINE L REV. 5105

(1989).
6. Upton, The Standard On Which ArbitratorsBase Their Decisions: The SROs Must Decide,
16 SEC. REG. LJ. 3, 3-4 (1988).
7. Robbins, A Practitioner'sGuide to SecuritiesArbitration, 650 PLI/CORP 15, 144 (1989).
8. Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 37 FORDIIAM URB. LJ. 419, 421 (1990).
9. See Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1990, § C at 1, col. 3
(eastern ed.).
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arbitrations before industry forums declined by 11.4% in 1989 from a 1988 high
of over 6000, the 10 years beginning in 1980 and
ending in 1989 have seen a
10
steady increase in customer-broker arbitrations.
Pressures by customers as well as brokerage houses are continually shaping
the contours of securities arbitration, 11 with some help from the courts 12 and
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). 13 Some securities arbitration
commentators are calling for the creation of a new arbitral forum. 14 Ideally, the
new forum would alleviate customers' concerns regarding the perceived bias of
the industry forums, 15 while substantially unburdening
the brokerage houses of
16
the expense of maintaining and funding the forums.
This Comment will discuss the present forums available for customer-broker
arbitration disputes, the problems arising in the current system, what changes in
the present system may help resolve these problems, and the desirability of
creating a new forum to handle all securities arbitrations between customers and
brokers. This Comment will not challenge the desirability of arbitrating customerbroker disputes in general.' 7 Indeed, many scholars and commentators argue
that arbitration is beneficial to both the customer and the broker because it
provides a more efficient and less expensive means of settling disputes than
litigation. 18 However, for arbitration to effectively handle customer grievances,
it is not merely enough that the process be fair, but the customer must perceive
it to be fair. 19 But first, a brief overview of the legal history of securities
arbitration would be helpful.

10. Wall Street Prods Investors to Mediate Rather Than Arbitrate Broker Disputes, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 20, 1990, § C at 1, col. 3 (eastern ed.).
11. See generally Katsoris, supra note 8. In his article, Professor Katsoris traces the history of
securities arbitration from its beginnings to the Supreme Court's most recent decision in Rodriguez,
taking into account the forces that created the present system. He concludes by stating his views
on the direction securities arbitration should move in the future to insure that the process continues
as a fair and efficient way to settle broker-investor disputes.
12. The courts have continued to play an important role in furthering the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements by allowing the agreement not only to limit the customer to
arbitration as opposed to litigation, but by allowing the agreement to limit the customer to certain
industry-backed arbitral forums. See infra notes 104-34 and accompanying text.
13. The SEC serves as a watchdog over arbitral forums established and controlled by the
brokerage houses. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
14. Street Eager for Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
15. See infra notes 210-29 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. For a criticism of arbitration of customer-broker disputes, see Comment, Just Saying No:
Avoiding Predispute Agreements to Arbiirate in Securities Cases, 1990 J. DisP. RESOL. 117.
18. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 421; Lusardi, Enforcement of Securities Agreements in Securities
FraudDisputes, 41 RUTrrGERS L REV. 541, 545 (1989).
19. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 421; Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L.R. 393, 460 (1987). See Lusardi, supra note
18, at 584-85.
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II. HISTORY

The Supreme Court first addressed the enforceability of pre-dispute
20
agreements to arbitrate customer-broker disputes in 1953 in Wilko v. Swan.
The Court held that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933'(1933 Act) 21
22
could not be subject to arbitration pursuant a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
Because the 1933 Act provided customers certain substantive rights enforceable
in federal court, the Court reasoned that pre-dispute arbitration agreements could
not strip customers of their statutory right to a remedy in court. 23 The Court
noted the strong federal policy favoring enforceability of arbitration agreements
embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 4 However, it decided the
danger of brokers' maneuvering clients into situations potentially weakening their
right to recover under the 1933 Act, as well as the unpredictability of arbitration
results, mandated the use of litigation. 25 In a nutshell, the Court viewed
arbitration as an inadequate means to enforce customers' rights expressly granted
26
under the 1933 Act.
Whether or not claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) 27 were arbitral pursuant pre-dispute arbitration agreements was left
unanswered by the Court until it addressed the issue 34 years later in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.28 In McMahon, the Court chose the FAA
as its analytical starting point. 29 It noted that the FAA's purpose was to reverse
judicial hostility toward arbitration by placing arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts. 30 The Court read Wilko to bar arbitration agreements only when arbitration was incapable of protecting the substantive rights
provided under federal law. 31 The Court reasoned that current arbitration
proceedings conducted at forums controlled by the securities exchanges and under
the auspices of the Securities Exchange Commission adequately protected the
statutory rights granted to customers under the 1934 Act. 32 Furthermore, the

20. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1982). The 1933 Act is intended to have "two basic objectives:
[t]o require that investors be provided with material information concerning securities offered for
public sale; and [t]o prevent misrepresentation, deceit, and other fraud in the sale of securities." L
SODEROUIST, SECURmES REGULAnON 2-3 (2d ed. 1988).
22. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
23. Id. at 435, 438.
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
25. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432.
26. Id. at 435-37.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(kk) 1982. The 1934 Act "seeks to ensure fair and orderly securities
markets by prohibiting certain types of activities and by setting forth rules regarding the operation
of the markets and participants." L SODERQUIST, supra note 21, at 4.
28. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
29. Id. at 225.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 228-29.
32. Id. at 233.
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Court alluded to a greatly expanded role for arbitration in customer-broker disputes
when it strongly implied that treble damages under RICO
were not to be outside
33
the scope of the arbitrator's power to award damages.
Just two years later in Rodriguez,a4 the Supreme Court overturned its
decision in Wilko and held that pre-dispute arbitration agreements could be
enforceable for 1933 Act claims.35 The Court went on to reject Wilko because
its reasoning was antiquated and out of touch with the modern realties of
arbitration. 36 Hence, the Court ruled that pre-dispute
arbitration clauses were
37
enforceable regardless of the underlying civil claim.
The effect of the Supreme Court's rulings in McMahon and Rodriguez has
been the increasing prevalence of arbitration as the sole mechanism of dispute
resolution in customer-broker disputes. 38 However, the issue of what is the
proper arbitral forum is far from settled.3 9
III. AVAILABLE FORUMS FOR CUSTOMER-BROKER
SECURITIES CLAIMS

At present, there are two basic forum alternatives for securities arbitration. 40 One alternative is arbitrating before forums controlled and subsidized by
the securities industry, where the vast majority of customer-broker claims are
heard. 41 The other is arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
42

(AAA).

A. SRO Forums
Various stock exchanges and the North Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) 43 serve as Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) for member brokerage
houses, establishing rules for arbitration procedures. 44 For example, large
brokerage houses such as Merrill Lynch or Shearson/American Express are
members of the securities exchanges they trade on, such as the New York Stock

33. Id. at 238.
34. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
35. Id. at 485.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Katsoris, supra note 8, at 421.
39. See infra notes 104-58 and accompanying text.
40. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 469-70.
41. Securities Firms Oppose SEC Bid to Give Investors More Flexibility on Arbitration, Wall
St. J., June 22, 1990, § C at 16, col. 5 (eastern ed.).
42. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 469-70.
43. Armbrust, Litigation Limited Partners' Securities Actions: Regulatory Framework, 391
PLI/CORP 21, 93 (1991).
44. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 427-29.
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Exchange (NYSE), as well as being members of the NASD. 45 SROs such as the
member brokerage houses, subsidize
NASD and NYSE, which are funded by the
46
arbitrations conducted in an SRO forum.
In 1977, a movement toward uniformity in SRO arbitrations began with an
effort to develop an effective means of handling small claims by customers against
brokerage houses. 47 The result of this effort was the formation of the Securities
SROs,
Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA).48 SICA members included
50
49
public.
general
the
and
(SIA)
Association
Industry
the Securities
The SICA initially established a small claims procedure and later developed a
Uniform Code of Arbitration (Code) which was to govern all customer claims
brought in SRO forums. 5 1 In 1979, SROs participating in the SICA adopted the
Code, which has been revised since McMahon.52 The SICA meets and amends
its rules periodically, but before the new rules go into effect they must be adopted
by the SROs individually and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 53 Usually, but not always, the SROs adopt the SICA rules.54 The
SEC is involved in this process in an oversight capacity, making suggestions to
rules and amendments. 55 The SICA continues to
the SICA and revising SICA
56
meet and modify the Code.
In 1989, approximately 5,500 arbitration claims were brought before SRO
the NASD. 57 The NYSE
arbitration forums with over 65% of those heard by
58
accounts for another 27% of the SRO arbitrations.
B. AAA Arbitration
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides an alternative to SRO
forums for securities arbitration. 59 The AAA is a non-profit organization
founded in 1926 to encourage all types of alternative dispute resolution. 6 The

45. See generally Robbins, supra note 7.
46. l&
47. Katsoris, Securities ArbitrationAfter McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 361, 362-63
(1988).
48. Id.
49. "The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry." Id. at 362 n.9.
50. Katsoris, supra note 47, at 362. Public representatives include attorneys, law professors
and others with expertise in the field. Id. at 362 n.10.
51. Id. at 369.
52. Robbins, supra note 7, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 451-52.
55. Id. at 429-30.
56. Id. at 430.
57. See Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
58. Id.
59. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 469-72.
60. Robbins, supra note 7, at 15, 24.
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AAA has no affiliation with the securities industry. 6 1 AAA arbitrations are
conducted pursuant to the AAA's Securities Arbitration Rules (SARs) which were
adopted by the AAA in 1987 and amended in 1989.62
IV. AAA v. SRO ARBITRATION
There are noticeable differences between AAA arbitration and SRO
arbitration. 63 Moreover, there is a common perception that SRO forums are
to brokers, and that AAA forums are more hospitable to
more favorable
64
investors.
A.

Cost and Efficiency

As of 1988, SRO forums generally processed disputes more quickly 65 and
inexpensively for customers than AAA forums.66 SRO forums are heavily
subsidized by the securities industry, allowing them to offer services to customers
for much less than the AAA, even though the SROs have recently increased the
costs of their services. 67 Filing fees for claims of $1,000 and less are now
$30,68 ranging up to $1800 for claims of $5 million or more. 69 Also, in cases
requiring more than one four hour session, arbitrators have discretion to assess the
costs to either party. 70 The policy of the SROs' new rules, according to James
E. Buck, senior vice-president at the NYSE, is to require "[a] customer who brings
an arbitration for $1 million . . . [to] carry his own freight." 71 On the other
hand, the AAA charges 3% on any claim up to $25,000 with a minimum charge
of $300, and a smaller percentage administrative fee applied to amounts in excess
of $25,000.72 Because the SRO hearing fees can make extended arbitrations
the notion that SRO arbitration is always
more costly, the AAA has challenged
73
less expensive for larger claims.

61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 144.
64. Robbins, Securities Arbitration: Preparationand Presentation,42 ARB. J. 3, 4 (vol. 2,
1987).
65. Robbins, supra note 7, at 9.
66. See Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
67. Investors' Feesfor Arbitration to Go Higher, Wall St. J. Aug. 28, 1990, § C at 1, col. 3
(eastern ed.).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Securities Arbitration Rules [S.A.R.s] Administrative Fee Schedule.
73. Comparisons of AAA and SRO Arbitration Systems, Securities Arbitration Practice
Seminar, Nov. 7, 1990 (NYCLACLE). "The SROs charge on a per hearing basis. Thus, a
$100,000 case taking three hearings will have a fee of $2,250 ($750) x 3 hearings). The AAA fee
is $1,500. Also, about 2.3% of AAA cases involve more than $50,000, so the low SRO fee for
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B. Speed

In 1988, the average time to process a dispute, from receiving a claim to
releasing the award, was 8.2 months at the NYSE, 12.1 months at the NASD and
AAA states
16.8 months at the AAA.7 4 However, recent data provided by the 75
the median time to process an arbitration claim is only 9.3 months.
One reason why AAA arbitration may take longer than its SRO counterpart
is that AAA procedural rules do not require an answer by the respondent, as do
SRO forums, which leaves the customer/claimant wondering what to expect at the
then
first hearing. 76 Furthermore, AAA requires less specificity in its complaint
77
do SRO forums, and "unfortunately, less ... is usually presented."
Another difference worth noting is that the SICA, which promulgates rules
adoption by individual SROs, is subject to SEC oversight; the AAA is
for later
78
not.
C. Impartiality
Seemingly, the main appeal to customers of the AAA forum is the perception
that it is impartial, not pro-brokerage house, as the SRO forums are perceived to
be. 79 However, the SICA Code, generally adopted by most brokerage houses,
requires that all cases involving disputes of more than $10,00080 shall be heard
by three arbitrators. 81 The majority of the arbitrators serving on the three person
panels may not be affiliated with the securities industry. 8 2 Disputes involving
less than $10,000 are heard by one arbitrator who is not affiliated with the
industry. 83 Until 1987, none of the AAA's security's arbitrators could be
affiliated with the securities industry. 8 4 However, AAA rules now provide that
in cases involving more than $25,000, one of the arbitrators on the three person

very small claims may be of little value. Also, the AAA will waive, reduce or defer the fee in
verifiable hardship situations (SAR § 48). Finally, a party may recover the fee as part of the
arbitration award.- Id.
74. Robbins, supra note 7, at 148.
75. Friedman, AAA Securities Arbitration: What You Need to Know Securities Arbitration
Practice Seminar, Nov. 7, 1990, 2 (NYCLACLE).
76. Robbins, supra note 7, at 148.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Id. at 3, 5.
79. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
80. Uniform Code of Arbitration [UCA] § 8.
81. Id.
82. Specifically excluded from serving as public arbitrators are brokers and registered
investment advisors, retired industry personnel, people who worked in the industry within the last
three years, professionals who spend over 20% of their time serving security industry clients and
spouses of industry personnel. Id.
83. Id. at § 2.
84. Robbins, supra note 7, at 20.
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panel must have an industry affiliation.8 5 Providing a sizable corps of capable
securities arbitrators without industry ties could be difficult for the AAA. In 1989,
of the AAA's 50,000 arbitrators, approximately 1,400 were qualified to hear
securities arbitration, and
57% of those-or 804 arbitrators-were affiliated with
86
the securities industry.

D. Choosing the Arbitrator
SRO and AAA forums employ different means of choosing the arbitrator.
Under the SICA Code, which generally governs SRO arbitrations, 87 the SRO's
Director of Arbitration chooses the arbitrator or panel 8 The Director must
inform the parties of the arbitrators' names and employment history for the last
ten years, as well as any conflicts of interest the arbitrators may have. 89 The
arbitrators themselves are required to disclose to the Director "any circumstances
that might preclude such arbitrator from rendering an impartial and objective
determination." 90 The parties may maket one peremptory challenge and an
unlimited number of challenges for causef
At the AAA, the parties themselves choose the arbitrator. Like the SROs,
the AAA requires at least one industry affiliated arbitrator on three person panels
for larger disputes. Each party is given two lists: one containing names of
industry arbitrators, and the other listing non-industry arbitrators.9 2 The parties
strike the names of arbitrators they do not want to hear their case and number the
remaining names on each list according to preference. 93 The AAA then merges
the lists of the two parties and invites arbitrators whom neither party eliminated
"in accordance with the designated order of mutual preference." 94 If the parties
are unable to agree on arbitrators, the AAA will choose the panel. 95 The parties
have access to extensive biographical data about the arbitrators, including their
96
history as arbitrators.
Some experienced arbitrators and commentators maintain that the securities
industry arbitrators on SRO panels are quick to spot broker wrongdoing and are
generally motivated by an honest desire to keep the industry free of unscrupulous

85. S.A.R.s §§ 9, 13.
86. .Robbins, supra note 7, at 21. As of November 1990, 53.7% or 1,362 of the AAA's pool
of securities arbitrators are affiliated with the securities industry. Friedman, supra note 75, at 7.
87. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
88. UCA § 8.
89. Id. at § 9.
90. Id. at § 11.
91. Id. at § 10.
92. Id. at § 13.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at § 14.
96. See Friedman, supra note 75, at 3.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1991/iss1/6

8

Moeller: Moeller: Your Forum or Mine - Where to Arbitrate Investor-Broker Securities Claims
1991]

SECURITIES ARBITRATION

practices. 97 However, the system suffers from a fatal flaw in many customers'
eyes: customers are not only being denied access to the courts pursuant a
colorable adhesive contract, but they must also bring their claim before an arbitral
forum established and subsidized by the alleged wrongdoer. 98 It is not so
unreasonable that customers may perceive themselves as facing a "stacked
deck." 99
V. YOUR FORUM OR MINE?
Brokerage firms control the selection of arbitral forums in pre-dispute clauses
and usually prefer to limit customers to SRO forums. 100 Customers have
challenged arbitration agreements that limit the available arbitral forums to SRO
forums and preclude arbitration before the AAA.1°1 Customers usually base
their challenge on a provision which is arguably one of the securities exchanges'
rules, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) constitution, which allows
arbitration before the AAA under certain circumstances. 10 2 It should be noted
that member brokerage houses are subject to the10 rules
of the exchanges on which
3
they trade-including the AMEX constitution.
A. The AMEX Window
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided in McMahon that customers' claims
under the 1934 Act were arbitral, 10 4 the parties in that case found themselves
in federal district court litigating whether the McMahons' claim should be
arbitrated before the AAA or the New York Stock Exchange. ° 5 The arbitration
agreement between the McMahons and Shearson contained a provision that the
McMahons believed incorporated a portion of the AMEX constitution known as

97. See Serota, supra note 5, at S108-09.
98. Securities Firms Oppose SEC Bid to Give Investors More Flexibility on Arbitration,supra
note 41, at col. 5. David Robbins, formerly director of arbitration at the AMEX and now an
attorney with a New York law firm, stated, "It's bad enough that access to court is foreclosed, let
alone a forum with no allegiance to the securities industry." Id
99. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260-61 (J.Blackmun, dissenting). See also Katsoris, supra note
47, at 383-84.
100. "As a matter of industry practice, arbitration clauses are included in customer account
agreements between brokerage firms and their customers." Bedell & Bosch, The Rodriguez
Decision: A New Tradition in the Arbitration of Securities Disputes, 18 SEC. REG. LJ. 53, 53
(1990). See generally SEC Urges Firms to Widen Options to Include Independent Panels, Wall St.
J., June 11, 1990, § C at 5, col. 4 (eastern ed.). While it appears most large brokerage house limit
their customers to SRO arbitration in pre-dispute agreements, a notable exception is A.G. Edwards
& Sons Inc., who claims it does not notice a significant difference among arbitral panels.
101. See infra notes 104-58 and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. Robbins, supra note 7, at 140-41.
104. See supra note 3.
105. McMahon, 709 F. Supp. at 370.
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the "AMEX Window". 1° 6 In a nutshell, the AMEX window allows customers
to request7 arbitration before the AAA if they have not expressly agreed to another
10
forum.
It is well-settled that the arbitration agreement can limit the arbitral forums
available to customers. 10 8 Frequently, arbitration agreements provide that
disputes between the broker and the customer shall be arbitrated according to the
"rules" of the AMEX, as well as other SRO forums, such as the NYSE and the
NASD. 10 9 This is where the AMEX window comes into play. The AMEX
constitution provides that customers be allowed "to elect to arbitrate before the
[AAA] in the city of New York, unless the customer has expressly agreed in
writing to submit only to the arbitration procedure of the Exchange." 110 The
issue before the courts now is whether this section allows customers who have
agreed to arbitrate according to the "rules" of various SROs, including the AMEX,
The customers' argument is that the
to choose to arbitrate before the AAA. 1
AMEX constitution is an SRO "rule" and becomes part of the arbitration
agreement. Therefore, absent customer agreement to limit himself to arbitration
"only before" certain SRO forums, the customer is free to step through the
"AMEX window" into an AAA forum. 112 However, various federal district
court decisions have rejected this proposition, 113 primarily on the basis that the

106. Id. at 372 n.7.
107. Id. at 371. The investment contract included a provision that stated the arbitration would
be "in accordance with the rules then in effect, of the [NASD, or the NYSE] and/or the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. as I (customer) may elect." The McMahons argued that the "rules" referred
to in the agreement included the AMEX constitution which provides that ". .. the customer may
elect to arbitrate before the [AAA] in the city of New York unless the customer has expressly
agreed in writing to submit only to the arbitration procedure of the Exchange." (emphasis added).
(AMEX CONST. art. VIII, § 2(c)). However, the court did not decide whether or not the language
in the arbitration agreement allowed the customer to elect to arbitrate before the AAA, but held that
the McMahons had waived their right to choose a forum by failing to comply with another
provision of the agreement requiring the customer to choose the forum within a certain time period.
McMahon, 709 F. Supp. at 373.
108. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.
1990). However, as the court noted, the SEC "prohibits arbitration agreements which limit
customers to a single SRO arbitration forum." (SEC Litigation Release No. 12198, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 184, 437 (August 7, 1989)) Georgiadis,903 F.2d at 113. Thus,
arbitration agreements which limit the customer to more than one SRO forum are not invalid.
109. See, e.g., Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318, 559 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. 1990);
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1990); McMahon, 709 F. Supp. 369; Wilson v. D.H. Blair & Co., 731
F. Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Bear Steams & Co. v. N.H. Karol & Assocs., 728 F. Supp 499
(N.D. 11. 1989); Hybert v. Shearson Lehman/American Exp., Inc., 1989 W.L. 64450 (N.D. Ill.).
110. AMEX CONST. art. VIII § 2(c).
111. See supra note 109.
112. Cowen, 76 N.Y.2d at 322, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
113. Hybert, 1989 W.L. 64450; Karol & Assocs., 728 F. Supp. at 500, 503-04; Piltch v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 714 F. Supp 537, 538 (D.D.C. 1989); Pitchford, 721
F. Supp. at 549.
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AMEX constitution is not a "rule" referred to in the standard arbitration
agreement. 114 Similarly, courts have reasoned that the parties never intended
an agreement allowing arbitration according to the procedures of the NYSE,
NASD and AMEX to create a fourth electable forum-the AAA. 11 5
Supporting the customers' position is the New York Court of Appeals'
decision in Cowen & Co. v. Anderson,116 where the court noted that the AMEX
constitution defines the "rules of the Exchange" to include the constitution
itself.' 17 The court concluded that because the "term 'rules' is not defined by
the agreements. . . [the customer] is, therefore, entitled to rely on the provision
in the AMEX constitution."1 18 Furthermore, the court explained that even if
the language of the agreement was ambiguous as to whether or not it allowed for
arbitration before the AAA, the court would use normal contract principles and
construe ambiguous terms against the drafter: the brokerage house. 119 It is
important to note that the court bases its decision on the specific wording of the
agreement. The court acknowledged that with proper drafting the brokerage
houses had the right to shut the AMEX window and preclude customers from
demanding arbitration before the AAA. 120
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has held the language "in accordance
with the rules then in effect of ... the [AMEX]" does not open the "AMEX
window". 12 1 However, that circuit has found similar language to be ambiguous
as to whether the customer is strictly limited to the SRO forums, or is able to
choose the AAA. 122 In Formica v. Malone,123 the Second Circuit held that
a clause in an arbitration agreement allowing for "arbitration ... on the [NYSE],
or before an arbitration facility provided by the [AMEX]" was ambiguous as to
whether the clause invoked the AMEX window; therefore, the customer was
allowed to choose to arbitrate before the AAA. 124 The court discussed both its

114. Id. Cf Cowen, 76 N.Y.2d at 323, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
115. Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. at 550.
116. 559 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1990), appeal dismissed without opinion, 76 N.Y.S.2d 935,
563 N.Y.S.2d 65, 564 N.E.2d 675 (1990).
117. Id. at 226 (AMEX CONST. an. 1, § 3(a)).
118. Id. at 226-27.
119. Id. at 228.
120. Id. at 227. The court harmonized its decision in Cowen with the Second Circuit's
decision earlier that same year in Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, reasoning that the language "'[a]ny
controversy between us... shall be settled by arbitration only before the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Incorporated, or the New York Stock Exchange, or an Exchange located in the
United States on which listed options transactions are executed'. . . bound ...

[the customers]...

to arbitrate their claim 'only before' the three self-regulatory organizations." Cowen, 76 N.Y.2d at
322, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
121. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106, 108.
122. See Formica v. Malone, 907 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir 1990).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 398-400.
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own earlier decision in Merrill Lynch v. Georgiadis125 and the New York Court
of Appeals decision in Cowen, and concluded that the interpretation of the specific
language used in the agreement was not controlled by either decision.1 26 The
Second Circuit remanded the case 127
to the district court to determine the parties'
intent expressed in the agreement.
One broker's attorney has opined that after Cowen, the outcome of the legal
challenge to the choice of arbitration forums will depend on whether the case is
brought in New York state or federal court. 128 While the Cowen Court
attempted to harmonize its decision with the Second Circuit's decision in
PaineWebber,Inc. v. Rutherford,129 a close reading of the two cases suggests
that New York state law and federal law conflict in this area. 130 Regardless of
the state and federal law conflict, New York law has a pervasive effect outside of
New York, because most customer agreements around the nation have choice of
law provisions stating the contract is subject to the law of the state of New
York. 13 1 Earlier this year, the Connecticut Supreme Court was confronted with
a case in which the customer had entered a securities contract with PaineWebber
providing for "arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect of ...

the

American Stock Exchange ..... 132 The parties agreed the Contract was to be
governed by New York state law. 133 The court,
relying on Cowen, held that
134
the AMEX window was open to the customer.
The AMEX window may soon become a matter of purely academic interest.
The AMEX has moved to amend its constitution to end the confusion and
conclusively close the window in those situations where the customer agrees to
arbitrate pursuant the "rules" of the AMEX and other SRO forums. 135 However, the SEC has yet to approve the proposed amendment, and at least one
commentator feels that the New York court's opinion in Cowen "gives opponents
of the change significant support." 136 Perhaps a greater threat to the window's

125. In Georgiadis, the customer signed an arbitration agreement stating "[A]ny controversy
between us arising out of such option transaction or this agreement shall be settled by arbitration
only before the [NASD or the NYSE] or an Exchange located in the United States upon which
listed options transactions are executed." Georgiadis,903 F.2d at III (emphasis in original). The
court held the customer was bound to arbitrate its dispute "only before" one of the enumerated
forums, and could not demand arbitration before the AAA. id. at 113.
126. Formica, 907 F.2d at 399-400.
127. Id.
128. Spencer, AMEX Window Opened for Aggrieved Investors, 7/11/90 N.Y.L.J. (col. 5) at 3.
129. 903 F.2d 106.
i30. See Cowen, 76 N.Y.2d at 320-21, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 226-27; Rutherford, 903 F.2d at 10708.
131. Spencer, Court of Appeals to Rule in Suit on Arbitration: Broker-CustomerDisputes
Head 23 Appeals on Docket 5/29/1990 N.Y.LJ., 1 (col. 5) at 5-6.
132. PaineWebber, Inc. v. American Arbitration Association, 1991 WL 4492 (Conn.) p. 3.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 3-4.
135. See Katsoris, supra note 8, at 471-72.
136. Spencer, supra note 131, at 4.
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use is that even the New York state court in Cowen conceded that the brokerage
houses may shut the window with proper drafting of pre-dispute arbitration
137
agreements.
B. Customers Without ArbitrationAgreements
Customers who have not signed pre-dispute arbitration agreements may also
avail themselves of the AMEX constitution and demand that brokerage houses
trading on the AMEX arbitrate disputes before the AAA. 138 While the vast
majority of customers enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 139
it appears that
140
it is generally the larger investors that escape the agreements.
As noted earlier, pursuant to article VIII section 2(c) of the AMEX
constitution customers may demand arbitration before the AAA "unless the
customer has expressly agreed to submit only to the arbitration procedure of the
Exchange." 14 1 Obviously, customers who have not entered a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement could not have "expressly agreed to submit" only to an SRO
forum, thereby waiving their rights to demand arbitration before the AAA.
However, a question arises as to whether customers are free to bring their claim
before any AAA forum, or if they are limited only to demanding arbitration before
the AAA in New York City, 142 which is the hub of securities activities.
In PaineWebber Inc. v. Pitchford,143 a New York federal district court
held that customers who had not signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement were
allowed to bring their claims before the AAA, but the brokerage house was able
to limit the forum to the AAA in New York City.'" The customers wanted to
bring their claim before the AAA in Florida.14 The court based its decision
on its interpretation of the relevant portion of the AMEX constitution. 146 The
brokerage house, PaineWebber, conceded that, as a member of the AMEX it was
obligated to accept arbitration before the AAA in New York City if the customer
147
so requested and had not agreed to limit himself strictly to SRO forums.
The court held that as applied to customers who had not entered a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement, the phrase "in the City of New York" was a venue-selecting

137. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. at 551.
139. Comment, supra note 17, at 131.
140. See Pitchford, 721 F.Supp. 542; Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106; Boudreau v. LF. Rothschild
Co., 1990 W.L 81861 (M.D. Fla.).
141. AMEX CONsT. art. VIII, § 2(c).
142. See Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. 542; Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106; Boudreau, 1990 W.L 81861.
143. 721 F. Supp. at 542.
144. Id. at 552.
145. Id. at 543.
146. Id. at 551.
147. Id. See also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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clause that obligated the brokerage house to arbitrate before
the New York AAA
148
only, not any AAA forum the customer may choose.
While the court's decision in Pitchfordrests on its interpretation of the "plain
language" of the AMEX constitution, 149 a district court in Florida decided the
matter differently in Boudreau v. L.F. Rothschild Co., Inc.150 In Boudreau, a
customer who had not signed an arbitration agreement filed for arbitration before
the AAA in Orlando, Florida, in reliance on article VIII section 1 of the AMEX
constitution. 151 The Orlando AAA agreed to hear the claim, but the brokerage
house challenged the AAA's propriety as the arbitral forum. 152 The Boudreau
court reasoned that the customer validly demanded arbitration pursuant to the
mandate of the AMEX constitution and properly exercised that right when he
chose the AAA as the arbitral forum. 153 The court merely mentioned the
federal district court's decision in Pitchford and went on to conclude that the
determination as to where the arbitration is to take place was one for the
arbitrator. 154 It would seem highly probable that the AAA arbitrator in Orlando
would find the Orlando AAA was a proper forum after initially agreeing to hear
the matter.
In Pitchford, the federal district court held the customer was limited to
arbitration before the AAA in New York City. 1 55 But more interesting than the
court's holding or legal reasoning was the fact that PaineWebber, the brokerage
house, was seemingly only willing to arbitrate with the customer because of the
legal compulsion of the AMEX constitution.15 6 If the customer, unfettered by
a pre-dispute arbitration clause, wanted to arbitrate before a different AAA forum,
it would have to be by a voluntary post-dispute agreement with PaineWebber. 157 Absent an agreement to arbitrate, the customers would have to bring
158
their claims the old-fashioned way-in federal court.
Whether PaineWebber would agree to arbitrate in an AAA forum outside of
New York City, in lieu of litigation, remains to be seen. However, the large New

148. Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. at 551.
149. Id.
150. 1990 W.L. 81861 (M.D. Fla.).
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id. at 3.
155. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
156. Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. at 550-51. See also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
157. See Scher v. Bear Steams, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 211, 213. See also Hollering, Enforcement
ofAgreement, 9/13/90 NYU 3 (col. 1) "ARBITRATION IS A CONSENSUAL process in which
contracting parties, either at the time of a dispute or by means of a future disputes clause, agree to
resolve their disputes in an arbitralrather than a judicialforum. Both federal and state arbitration
law, and a wealth of judicial authority, provide for the prompt and vigorous enforcement of
arbitration agreements, like other contracts, pursuant to their terms." Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id.
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York brokerage houses have shown an aversion to non-SRO arbitration
outside the
16 0
159
possibly for good reason.
friendly confines of New York City,
VI. GIVING THE CUSTOMER A CHOICE

As the customer's choice of arbitral forums is increasingly being narrowed
to SRO forums exclusively, 161 it appears now is the time for Congress and/or
162
the SEC to take affirmative steps to insure fairness in the arbitral process.
Because federal courts have continually struck down state regulatory efforts due
to federal preemption in the arbitration field, 163 the burden to make changes
falls squarely upon the SEC and Congress. 164 One of these two entities should,
at minimum, mandate that customers bound by arbitration agreements have a right
to bring their claims before non-SRO forums-namely the AAA.
In response to the Supreme Court's holding in McMahon,165 the Securities
Arbitration Reform Act of 1988 (hereinafter Reform Act) 166 was introduced into
Congress. The Reform Act would have required that arbitration agreements be
placed on a separate page of customer-broker account contracts, be separately
signed by the customer, and include a disclosure provision explaining to the
customer the consequences of entering the agreement. 167 Moreover, the bill
would also have prohibited brokerage houses from making a pre-dispute arbitration

159. Robbins, supra note 7, at 9.
160. See Securities Firms Charge Arbitration Bias, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1990, § C at 1.
PaineWebber and Neuberger & Berman brought a lawsuit challenging an arbitration decision by the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange awarding aggrieved options traders more than $1 million in damages,
accusing the Exchange of "choos[ing] sides and favoring the hometown boys." Id.
161. See supra notes 108-15.
162. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 477; Serota, supra note 5, at S112-13; Brown, Shell, & Tyson,
Arbitration of Customer-Broker Disputes Arising Under the Federal Securities Laws and RICO, 15
SEC. REG. LJ. 3, 33-36 (1987); Lusardi, supra note 18, at 541, 590.
163. On October 29, 1990, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
struck down an amendment to FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1988) requiring brokerage houses to allow
customers to choose to arbitrate disputes before the AAA or another non-industry forum as well as
an industry forum. Security Indus. Assoc. v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (1990). The court found the
Florida statute was preempted by federal law, namely the FAA. Id. at 206. The district court's
decision cited a recent First Circuit decision, Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 114
(1st Cir. 1989). Lewis, 751 F. Supp. at 206. In Connolly, the court struck down a Massachusetts
statute which prohibited brokers from requiring non-institutional customers to enter mandatory predispute arbitration agreements as a condition for doing business with the brokerage house. The
Connolly court held the statute was preempted by the FAA. Connolly, 883 F.2d at 118, 122. See
also Serota, supra note 5, at S111-12.
164. See Serota, supra note 5, at S112.
165. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
166. H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The sponsors of this bill were Rep. John
Dingell (D-Mich.), Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Rep. Frederich C. Boucher (D-Va.).
167. Id. at § 7(B)(i), (iii). UCA § 32 has adopted an approach very similar to that proposed
by the authors and the NYSE has approved and adopted the disclosure requirements in its
Arbitration Rules § 636.
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agreement a condition for customers wishing to do business with the brokerage
house. 168 The Reform Act provided that the SEC was to implement the
changes by promulgating regulations, for which the Act set out minimum
169
requirements.
The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, which
oversees the SEC, held hearings on the Act on March 31, June 9, and July 12 of
1988.170 The Securities Industry Association (SIA), Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
Shearson, Lehman & Hutton, Inc., and the SICA represented the securities
industry and testified before the subcommittee. 171 The Consumer Federation,
the North American Securities Administrators Association, and the SEC,
representing the public, were also present and testified. 172 At the hearings the
SEC and the SICA convinced the subcommittee to allow them more time to work
together to reform the arbitration process. 173 The SEC suggested numerous rule
changes for the SICA to lobby the securities industry to adopt, including
encouraging the brokerage houses to draft arbitration clauses offering the AAA as
an alternative arbitral forum. 174 While the Arbitration Reform Act did not
make it out of committee in 1988,17' Representative Edward Markey, a cosponsor of the bill, still believes the process needs to be reformed. 176 Markey
was quoted recently in the Wall Street Journal as stating "there is still a question
of whether or not individuals should be compelled to go
to arbitration that is
177
industry dominated. It's a freedom of choice question."
Presently, the SEC is "prodding" the nation's largest stock exchanges to give
customers the option of bringing their disputes to an independent arbitral
forum. 178 The industry response has been a staunch refusal of the SEC's
request.' 79 Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in McMahon, the SEC had
promulgated a regulation making it a "fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act
or practice" for a brokerage house to enter an agreement with a customer
mandating arbitration of federal securities law claims.' 8 0 While SEC no longer
prohibits brokerage houses from requiring customers to agree to arbitrate federal

168. Id. at § 7(BXii).
169. Id. at § 7(B).
170. Bedell & Bosch, supra note 100, at 84.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 85-86.
174. Id. at 85.
175. Id. at 84-87.
176. Arbitration Cases Over Securities Declined Last Year, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1990, § C at 5,
col. 4 (eastern ed.).
177. Id.
178. SEC Urges Firms to Widen Arbitration Options to Include Independent Panels, supra
note 100.
179. Securities Firms Oppose SEC Bid to Give Investors More Flexibility on Arbitration,
supra note 41.
180. 17 C.F.R. 21240.15c2-2 (1987).
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claims due to the Supreme Court's holdings in McMahon and Rodriguez,18 1 a
regulation mandating that customers be allowed to choose an independent arbitral
forum would go a long way in allaying customers' fears of forum bias.
However, in response to SEC pressures to allow an AAA option in arbitration
agreements, the SIA, a securities industry trade association, has claimed the lack
of SEC oversight of AAA arbitration is problematic. 182 Apparently noting
McMahon's reliance on SEC oversight of the arbitral process as grounds for
upholding agreements requiring arbitration of 1934 Act claims, 183 the SIA
argues that allowing customers to arbitrate disputes before an independent forum
might make such decisions unenforceable. 184 The SIA's conclusion appears
185
dubious.
The simple answer to the SIA's fear would be to bring AAA arbitration
under SEC oversight. 186 Neal Brown, a practicing attorney, along with Richard
Shell and William Tyson, professors of law at the University of Pennsylvania's
187
Warton School of Law, argue for just such a proposal in a recent article.
Furthermore, they advocate the SEC's mandating a uniform procedural code for
all arbitrations. 188 The authors suggest that the SEC should look to the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for guidance in amending the
present SICA Code. 189 The CFTC has promulgated regulations to govern
commodities markets disputes. 190 Two changes the authors recommend are:
(1) requiring separately executed arbitration agreements with disclosure statements
explaining the legal consequences of the agreement; 19 1 and (2) allowing the
parties to select the arbitrators themselves with the aid of information concerning
securities arbitrations the arbitrators were involved with in the past five
years. 192 Moreover, Madelaine Eppenstein, a prominent customers' attorney
from the New York law firm of Eppenstein & Eppenstein, 193 claims that one
of several reasons customers believe AAA forums to be fairer is that the parties
are able to engage in an arbitrator selection process which is much more expansive

181. See Scher, 723 F. Supp. 211, 213-14.
182. Securities Firms Oppose SEC Bid to Give Investors More Flexibility on Arbitration,
supra note 41, at 16, col. 5-6.
183. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
184. See Securities Firms Oppose SEC Bid to Give Investors More Flexibility on Arbitration,
supra note 41, at 16, col. 6.
185. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
186. See Brown, Shell & Tyson, supra note 162, at 34.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 34-35.
190. 17 C.F.R. 180.3(b)(2), (6) (1980).
191. The SICA and the NYSE have adopted very similar disclosure rules. See supra note 167.
02. Brown, Shell & Tyson, supra note 162, at 35-36.
193. The Eppensteins represented the McMahons both in the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as representing Anderson in Cowens, 76 N.Y.2d 318, 559
N.Y.S.2d 225.
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than the procedure at194the SROs, after reviewing background information about
potential arbitrators.
It is questionable whether the courts will have any part in securities
arbitration reform. 195 Although courts have consistently rejected the argument
that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are adhesive contracts, 196 it may be time
for courts to re-examine their rulings in light of pre-dispute agreements that
continually narrow the forum choice to only particular SRO forums. 19 7 The
SEC maintains that customers should have a choice of any SRO forum of which
the brokerage house is a member. 198 Furthermore, David Robbins, a former
arbitration director at the AMEX who now works for a New York law firm, has
stated, "[ilt's bWd enough that access to court
is foreclosed, let alone a forum with
199
no allegiance to the securities industry."
On the other hand, the brokerage houses funding the SRO forums are
beginning to feel the weight of the heavy financial burden of subsidizing the
arbitration process.2 00 The NASD, which handled 65% of the arbitration cases
filed in SRO forums in 1989, spent $10 million to fund the process-10% of its
total budget-while collecting only three million dollars in fees. 20 1 Aggravating
matters for the NASD is the fact that it hears many claims that arise out of
securities transactions on other exchanges. 20 2 This is because many arbitration
agreements give the customer a choice of various SRO forums should a dispute
arise, and the NASD appears to be the forum of choice.20 3 Moreover, one
securities industry commentator notes that while there is a general sentiment
among investors that AAA forums are fairer than SRO forums, there is also a
feeling that of the two major 20forums,
the NASD and the NYSE, the NASD is
4
more hospitable to customers.
The brokerage houses' posture towards AAA arbitration places them in a
paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the brokerage houses want to escape the
high cost of subsidizing the vast majority of customer disputes; 20 5 but on the

194. Telephone interview with Madelaine Eppenstein of Eppenstein & Eppenstein in New
York City (Mar. 28, 1991).
195. See Serota, supra note 5, at S112.
196. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 423 n.8.
197. See Comment, supra note 17, at 130-32.
198. See SEC Urges Firms to Widen Arbitration Options to Include independent Panels, supra
note 100, at 5, col. 4 (eastern cd.).
199. Securities Firms Oppose SEC Bid to Give Investors More Flexibility on Arbitration,
supra note 41, § C at 16, col. 5.
200. Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Wilson, How to Fight Your Broker, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1988, 43.
205. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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other hand, they are adamantly opposed to submitting to arbitration before the
AAA-especially outside the city of New York.20 6
Furthermore, the situation becomes more enigmatic where an arbitration
agreement limits available arbitral forums to only a few specific SRO forums.
While such limitations are valid,20 7 the SEC believes that customers should
20 8
have the option for choosing an independent forum to arbitrate their disputes.
It appears that two main rationales for the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements noted in McMahon and Rodriguez are brought into conflict by these
restrictive agreements: the FAA's expressed policy to make arbitration agreements
contract, and the benefit of SEC oversight over the
enforceable just as any other
2 9
SRO arbitration process. 0
VII. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The customers' perception that SRO forums are inherently unfair, coupled
with the brokerage houses' disenchantment with the increasing costs of funding
the SRO forums, leaves some securities industry insiders and commentators calling
for the creation of a single "superforum". 2 10 For SROs, a superforum offers the
possibility of escaping the increasingly high cost of hearing arbitration claims
against its member brokerage firms. 211 For the customers, a superforum allows
them to escape arbitration in the brokerage houses' backyard.212 An added
to a variety of rules that
advantage of a single forum would be to bring uniformity
213
exist at different SRO forums and with the AAA.
A. The "Superforum"
If the superforum is to be a viable solution to the problems facing the current
securities arbitration system, the structure and procedures of the new forum should
214
incorporate many of the advantages of the more sophisticated SRO systems
and the perceived impartiality of the AAA. 215 The next section of this Comment will discuss considerations to be taken into account in developing an
arbitration system capable of accommodating the concerns of both customers and
brokers.

206. See supra notes 113, 152-74 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
208. SEC Urges Frims to Widen Arbitration Options to Include Independent Panels, supra
note 100.
209. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226, 238.
210. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 383; Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
See Brown, Shell & Tyson, supra note 162, at 33-34.
211. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
212. See Katsoris, supra note 8, at 475.
213. Id. at 476.
214. See Robbins, supra note 7, at 126-226.
215. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 473-75.
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B. Funding
One of the first issues facing a new superforum would be how to fund
it. 2 16 David Robbins, former director of arbitration at the AMEX and now an
attorney for a New York law firm, believes that the brokerage houses would still
have to play a major role in its funding. 2 17 On the other hand, Constantine
Katsoris, a professor at Fordham Law School and a leading expert on securities
2 18
arbitration, has argued that a new forum should find a new means of funding.
Professor Katsoris believes independent funding would help insure that the new
forum remains truly independent of pressures from either brokers or customers.

2 19

Moreover, a problem with the SROs' continuing to carry the brunt of the
funding burden is the risk of perpetuating the perception that the new forum, like
220
its predecessor the SRO forums, is biased in favor of the brokerage houses.
Additionally, the SROs would most likely prefer not to subsidize a new
superforum in full or in part because one of their22main
interests in a superforum
1
is to escape the high cost of the present system.
Professor Katsoris has suggested placing a surcharge on each securities
transaction to be used to fund the new system. 222 This would offer the advantage of distancing the SROs and brokerage houses from the arbitral forum, as well
as relieving them of the high cost of subsidizing it. 22 3 Another means of
funding a new forum may be to adopt a fee system similar to that used by the
AAA.22 4 While this would raise the potential cost of arbitration to some
225
customers, that risk seems inherent in the creation of a single forum.
Furthermore, as the AMEX window cases poignantly illustrate, many customers
appear willing to pay the extra costs of arbitration before the AAA instead of an
SRO.226
On the other hand, some of the fears of financing an independent forum may
be overdrawn. 22 7 Professor Katsoris believes that creating a new superforum
would lead to greater economies of scale that would ultimately lower the cost of

216. Id. at 475.
217. See Street Eager for Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
218. See Katsoris, supra note 8, at 475.
219. Id. at 473.
220. Telephone conversation with Madelaine Eppenstein, supra note 194. See also Street
Eager for Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9. In the article, David Robbins was quoted as
saying "[t]he old boy network, which may exist in certain places should not be as prevalent...
[blut there really would be no change in perception." Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1990, § C at 1, col. 4.
221. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
222. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 475.
223. Id. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
225. See Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
226. See supra notes 104-58 and accompanying text.
227. See Katsoris, supra note 8, at 475.
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228
arbitration.
However, not all securities arbitration experts share this senti22 9
ment.

C. Arbitrators
Another problem facing a potential independent superforum is how to stock
the new system with qualified arbitrators. 23 If the system does not have the
23 1
funds initially to pay competent arbitrators, it may never get off the ground.
Obviously, present SRO and AAA arbitrators could serve in the new superforum. 23 2 Because the majority of securities arbitrations is handled by the
SROs at this time, most of the available arbitrators would be SRO arbitrators. 2 33 While it may be argued that mainly using SRO arbitrators would
perpetuate the perceived pro-brokerage bias of the old system, 234 the use of
these arbitrators may not create any true bias problems. In the typical three
majority of the arbitrators
arbitrator panel that hears most SRO arbitrations, the
235
will not be associated with the securities industry.
D. Rules for the New Forum
An important consideration for the proposed new forum would be choosing
the appropriate rules for its proceedings. To start drafting rules from scratch
2 6
would not make sense, when the SICA Code would provide a ready guide. 3
Arguably, it would be simplest and most prudent to adopt the present SICA code
with necessary modifications. 237 The SICA rules are the product of years of
experience of drafting rules to cover the over 25,000 SRO arbitrations to
SICA Code is the oversight
date.238 Another factor in favor of adopting the 239
provided by the SEC in the rules drafting process.

228. Id.
229. See Street Eager for Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9. Said Richard Ryder, editor of
the Securities Arbitration Commentator, "Competition holds prices down better than monopolies."
Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1990, § C at 17, col. 1.
230. Id.
231. 1d
232. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 475.
233. In 1988 and 1989 respectively, the AAA heard 495 and 440 securities arbitration cases.
Friedman, supra note 75, at 2. In those same two years, SRO forums heard 6,101 and 5,403 cases
respectively. Arbitration Cases Over Securities Declined Last Year, supra note 176.
234. See Street Eagerfor Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
235. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
236. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 477; see also Brown, Shell & Tyson, supra note 162, at 34-35.
237. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 477.
238. Id. at 476.
239. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Now that the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the validity of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements 240 and the brokerage houses have responded by increasingly limiting the arbitral forum to industry-subsidized forums, 241 the time has
come to protect the customers' interest in arbitrating before a fair and efficient
forum, free from industry bias. To insure fairness, customers should not be
restricted to arbitrating only before SRO forums. This Comment has discussed two
methods of accomplishing this goal of fairness. One option is for the SEC or
Congress to require that the brokerage houses provide the customer with an option
to arbitrate in an independent arbitral forum, namely the AAA.2 4 2 While
customers may welcome such a development, including an AAA alternative in
arbitration agreements is probably no cure-all. 243 Brokerage houses are leery
244
of AAA arbitrations, especially those conducted outside of New York City.
Furthermore, the AAA may
not be able to handle the current crush of arbitration
245
cases before the SROs.
The other solution discussed in this Comment is to create a single forum for
arbitrating customer grievances. 246 But the new forum would need to be
independent of the industry influences which customers believe taint SRO
forums.247

Theoretically, the "superforum" solution could offer advantages

benefitting both the customer, by providing a neutral forum, and the brokerage
248
houses, by freeing them from the expense of subsidizing arbitrations.

240. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 104-60 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
243. Katsoris, supra note 8, at 476. Professor Katsoris points to two reasons why he believes
the AAA is not a viable single forum for securities arbitration at this time: the lack of subsidization and the absence of SEC oversight.
244. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 210-35 and accompanying text.
247. See Katsoris, supra note 8, at 475.
248. Id. at 473-77.
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Requiring 49SEC oversight over the superforum would help insure it is fair and
2
efficient.
The time for change appears to be drawing near. 250 The SEC is
encouraging the brokerage houses to include the AAA as an option in arbitration
agreements. 251 The brokerage houses are giving serious consideration to the
formation of a single forum. 252 And finally, customers, increasingly frustrated
by the use3 of restrictive pre-dispute arbitration clauses, should be eager for a
25
change.
CHRISTOPHER J. MOELLER

249. See generally Brown, Shell & Tyson, supra note 162, at 33-34.
250. See Finding a Forum for Arbitration,N.Y. Times, July 12, 1990, § D at 8, col. 3.
251. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
252. See Street Eager for Arbitration Superforum, supra note 9.
253. See Bedell & Bosch, supra note 100, at 86-87; Street Eagerfor ArbitrationSuperforum,
supra note 9.
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